Financial Stability Report. May 2009 by Banco de España
FINANCIAL STABILITY 
REPORT 
05/2009
 

FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT MAY 2009

FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT MAY 2009
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted 
provided that the source is acknowledged.
© Banco de España, Madrid, 2009
ISSN: 1696-2621 (print)
ISSN: 1696-3520 (online)
Depósito legal: M. 52740-2002
Printed in Spain by Artes Gráficas Coyve, S. A.
ABBREVIATIONS*
€ Euro
AIAF Asociación de Intermediarios de Activos Financieros (Association of Securities Dealers)
ABCB Asset-backed commercial paper
ATA Average total assets
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BIS Bank for International Settlements
bn Billions
bp Basis points
CBE Banco de España Circular
CBSO Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Banco de España Central Credit Register
CDOs Collateralised debt obligations
CDS Credit Default Swap
CEIOPS Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors 
CIs Credit institutions
CNMV Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (National Securities Market Commission)
CPSS Basel Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
DIs Deposit institutions
EAD Exposure at default
ECB European Central Bank
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EU European Union
FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board
FSA Financial Services Authority
FSAP Financial System Assessment Program
FSR Financial Stability Report
FVCs Financial vehicle corporations
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GVA Gross value added
GVAmp Gross value added at market prices
IAS International Accounting Standards
ICO Instituto Oficial de Crédito (Official Credit Institute)
ID Data obtained from individual financial statements
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions
LBOs Leveraged buy-out operations
LGD Loss given default
LTV Loan-to-value ratio (amount lent divided by the appraised value of the real estate used as collateral)
m Millions
MEFF Mercado Español de Futuros y Opciones (Spanish Financial Futures and Options Market)
MiFID Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
MMFs Money market funds
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
PD Probability of default
PER Price earnings ratio
pp Percentage points
ROA Return on assets
ROE Return on equity
RWA Risk-weighted assets
SCIs Specialised credit institutions
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SIVs Structured investment vehicles
SPV Special-purpose vehicle
TA Total assets
TARP Troubled Asset Relief Program
VaR Value at risk
WTO World Trade Organisation
* The latest version of the explanatory notes and of the glossary can be found in the November 2006 edition of the 
 Financial Stability Report.
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Overview
Since the last Financial Stability Report (FSR), the setting in which financial institutions operate 
has been characterised by high uncertainty and instability. Difficulties persist on international 
financial markets and even institutions with good credit ratings have seen their access ham-
pered, if not closed, to wholesale funding markets. That said, the public guarantees on debt 
issues  implemented in many countries are contributing to alleviating this situation. There has 
been a swift and sharp deterioration in the real economy, and an unprecedented synchronisa-
tion of the cycle worldwide.
The gravity of the situation and its deterioration have led the authorities in different countries to 
adopt exceptional measures to support the financial system in order to avert its collapse. In-
deed, since the last FSR, the need to bail out or lend public support to numerous institutions 
in various countries has continued. The US government has been injecting capital into many 
institutions, including the biggest banks, since the end of 2008. In Europe certain large banks 
have received direct State assistance. These measures have been complemented by expan-
sionary fiscal and monetary policy action.
Initially, Spanish deposit institutions were relatively unaffected by the international financial 
crisis insofar as their retail banking model is different to the originate-to-distribute banking 
model at the root of the crisis. This, coupled with counter-cyclical provisions and the absence 
of off-balance sheet investment vehicles (conduits and SIVs), explain the lesser initial impact 
on the Spanish banking system. 
However, Spanish institutions, like those in other countries, face the risks arsing from a much 
weaker and more uncertain economic situation. Growth in the euro area weakened substan-
tially in 2008 Q4, while the forecasts for 2009 and 2010 were revised sharply downwards. The 
Spanish economy went into recession in late 2008, with unemployment rising significantly. And 
this, together with the adjustment in the real estate sector, is prompting a strong rise in bad 
debts.
The substantial deterioration in the real economy, which means lower customer demand for 
credit, and greater caution by banks in extending credit, given the higher risk profile of borrow-
ers, account for how bank balance sheet risks are trending.
The growth of bad debts depends not only on the cyclical position of the economy but also on 
each institution’s lending policy. Hence, although all institutions have expanded their balance 
sheets vigorously and, in particular, their loan portfolios, not all growth strategies have been 
the same. Even within the same strategy, not all institutions have made the same selection of 
credit risk. Finally, not all of them are showing the same ability to cope with the much more 
complex setting in place since August 2007. 
Difficulties in obtaining funding on wholesale markets continue for international institutions, 
including Spanish ones. Several factors have helped ease bank’s liquidity position, including 
most notably: the term structure of bank debt in Spain, centred on the medium and long term, 
despite this being more costly; government measures, including asset purchases and the 
provision of guarantees for issues by banks; and ECB action, in particular full allotment at a 
fixed rate for all maturities; and the ability of the Spanish banking system to step up deposit-
taking. 
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The results of Spanish deposit institutions in 2008 were positive on the whole, though lower 
than the previous year. The fact they outperformed those posted by institutions from other 
banking systems in the developed countries largely reflects the traditional business of retail 
banking prevailing in Spain, which is based more on recurrent income as there is less reliance 
on that obtained from the financial markets.
However, the results of Spanish institutions will remain under downward pressure. In the short 
term this will be due to higher bad debts, resulting in the need for greater specific provisions 
(which will be only partly offset by general provisions). And in the medium term this will be 
because competition to raise funding will exert downward pressure on margins, which it will 
not be possible to offset against higher volumes of activity, since the deleveraging of the finan-
cial sector and that of the economy as a whole cannot be considered transitory, either in Spain 
or globally.
The longer it takes for the difficulties on financial markets to unravel, and the sharper and more 
durable the downturn in the real economy, the greater the pressure on earnings and the high-
er the number of institutions subject to such pressure will be. Thus, they must rationalise their 
cost structures either through reorganising the number and average size of their branches, or 
through solutions involving several institutions via the processes deemed appropriate.
Solvency generally remains above the minimum levels required by capital regulations, which 
have been transposed into Spanish law seeking the most prudent and demanding options. 
Similarly, the leverage of Spanish deposit institutions is lower than that recorded in other simi-
lar banking systems.
In short, the international financial environment is more difficult than in the last FSR, and the 
Spanish economy, like that of other countries, has begun to deteriorate very sharply and to a 
greater degree than was initially forecast. Spanish institutions must withstand higher bad debt 
ratios and increased pressure brought to bear on their results and capital against a backdrop 
in which activity will not grow at the same pace as in the past. In this respect, not all institutions 
are subject to the same degree to these pressures; there are differences in the lending policies 
they pursued during the upturn and in their risk management capacity, which in turn makes for 
differences in bad debts. Moreover, from the standpoint of the elements (profitability and sol-
vency) that enable them to withstand the manifestation of the risks incurred, not all institutions 
have the same profit-generating capacity or the same attributes in terms of solvency. In any 
event, in the light of the current economic situation the Spanish banking system must restruc-
ture itself and adopt cost optimisation strategies.
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1 Macroeconomic risks and financial markets
Since the last FSR, the international setting in which Spanish credit institutions operate has 
been characterised by high uncertainty and instability, amid persistent difficulties in the finan-
cial arena aggravated by the notable turn for the worse in economic developments in 2008 Q4 
and the poor growth outlook for 2009. The crisis, which is global in nature, is worsening 
gravely in certain developed countries in which the financial sector is particularly important.
The gravity of and deterioration in the situation compelled national economic authorities to adopt 
numerous fiscal stimulus and support initiatives to underpin the financial system. The fiscal 
stimulus measures were essentially targeted at easing the effects of the crisis on activity and 
employment, while the support initiatives were aimed at sustaining the financial system. The lat-
ter resulted in various waves of rescue plans and a commitment to prevent the bankruptcy of all 
systemic institutions. Thus, among other measures, those guaranteeing bank deposits and 
other liabilities of credit institutions, the guarantees on medium- and long-term bond issues and 
the plans to inject public funds into credit institutions (see Box 1.1) should be highlighted. 
In 2008 Q4 these measures provided some support to the capital markets, although respite 
was temporary as losses at some financial institutions proved higher than expected and the 
final implementation of some of the rescue plans was beset by uncertainty. Furthermore, mar-
ket dynamics were influenced by fears that the economic recession would be deeper and 
more protracted which, if borne out, would lead to further deterioration in the financial sector 
balance sheet.
Some improvement was seen on money markets with respect to mid-September, although 
their behaviour is far from normal and in early 2009 fresh rises were recorded in risk premia 
(see Chart 1.1.A). The abundant supply of liquidity by central banks and, in certain cases direct 
intervention, such as the Federal Reserve’s purchase of asset-backed commercial paper, were 
pivotal in bolstering these markets. These actions were accompanied by a significant reduc-
tion in official interest rates, which reached record lows, on occasions around 0%. A stop was 
also put to the deterioration of certain credit markets which had previously posted very sub-
stantial increases in interest rate spreads (see Chart 1.1.B). These conditions, together with 
the public-sector guarantees to back bank issues boosted the volume of activity on primary 
fixed-income markets at the beginning of 2009, especially in the United States.
Stock market indices in the developed economies and in certain emerging areas once again 
posted heavy declines, with the financial sector showing the highest volatility (see Charts 1.1.C 
and 1.1.D). Bank share prices were influenced by the uncertainty surrounding the viability of 
certain institutions, the deterioration of the sector’s earnings outlook and the envisaged cuts in 
dividends.
The measures to rescue the financial sector, tax stimulus programmes and the strong deterio-
ration in activity gave rise to a worsening of public finances, giving credence to forecasts of 
high budget deficits in the future in most countries. These factors were reflected in the risk 
premia of sovereign debt credit derivatives, which increased significantly. Yields on public debt 
securities also rose, though not across the board. In certain countries, such as the United 
States, the upward impact on interest rates on the biggest issues linked to higher public sector 
borrowing requirements was amply offset by the strong demand for these securities as a safe 
haven.
The external environment 
remained extremely 
complex and continued to 
show strains…
… despite the numerous 
bail-out and fiscal stimulus 
measures adopted by 
economic authorities.
Some improvement in 
money and credit markets 
underpinned by authorities’ 
actions…
… spurred a recovery in 
private fixed-income issues.
Equities fell and there were 
doubts about the viability of 
certain financial institutions.
Government debt CDS 
spreads widened in the face 
of worsening public 
finances.
Over the past year and in early 2009 there has been a succession of 
programmes to bail out ailing financial institutions. These programmes 
saved the financial system from collapse, though they have not suf-
ficed to restore its functioning to a normal footing. The global nature 
of the crisis, the size of the losses, the uncertainty over the final scale 
of those losses and the urgency with which these programmes had 
to be devised and applied gave rise to some improvisation and, in 
certain cases, emulation in the responses adopted. Therefore, while 
some countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, 
were driven to respond almost in unison to the deterioration of their 
financial systems, other countries where the initial impact of the finan-
cial crisis was smaller had some leeway to design measures more 
tailored to the problems of their credit institutions.
Until September 2008 the US and UK authorities reacted on a case-
by-case basis, supporting certain institutions considered systemic1 
and taking control of others2. As the year unfolded, the magnitude of 
the losses covered by capital contributions by the public sector in-
creased and posted a sharp rise from 15 September, when Lehman 
Brothers was declared bankrupt, being unable to obtain private fi-
nancing or government backing. This triggered a sudden and far-
reaching rise in instability on financial markets globally for two rea-
sons. First, it underlined the complex and interconnected nature of 
the international financial system and the difficulty of ascertaining the 
true scope of a bankruptcy of this size. And further, it emphasised the 
need for large-scale public sector involvement to restore confidence 
and avert an abrupt and disorderly adjustment in the sector.
Thereafter, the authorities applied a series of rescue plans aimed not 
only at isolated institutions but at all those deemed systemic, with the 
aim of restoring the functioning of financial markets and avoiding the 
repetition of a bout of extreme volatility like that following the bank-
ruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Distinct stages can be discerned in these 
initiatives, underlining the difficulties of implementing an effective and 
swift response to the potential collapse of the financial system. The 
first phase began on 3 October with US Congressional approval of 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The main aim of this plan 
was to restore the market price formation mechanism through the 
purchase by the Treasury of assets with valuation problems and, at 
the same time, achieve some restructuring of balance sheets. How-
ever, the problems of implementing this measure in the short term 
soon became evident and this, together with the worsening market 
instability, meant that before it was applied other types of solutions 
were proposed.
Against this backdrop, on 8 October the UK Treasury announced a 
financial sector rescue plan aimed at improving banks’ ability to raise 
capital. The main features of this plan were capital injections in the 
form of preference shares, making it possible to improve solvency 
ratios, and public guarantees for debt issued by banks. Several coun-
tries adopted initiatives inspired by this rescue plan. Thus, on 14 Oc-
tober, scarcely 11 days after the approval of the TARP, the US Treas-
ury relaxed the criteria governing its application to permit capital 
injections and also announced a programme of guarantees backed 
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for bank debt 
issues (see accompanying panel).
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BOX 1.1INTERNATIONAL BANK RESCUE PLANS
MAIN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS WITH PUBLIC-SECTOR BACKING FOR THEIR CAPITAL
SOURCE: Market information.
Country Bank Country Bank
UNITED STATES FRANCE
American International Group Banques Populaires
Citigroup Inc. Caisse d'Épargne
Bank of America Corp. BNP Paribas
Wells Fargo & Co. Crédit Agricole
JP Morgan Chase & Co. Crédit Mutuel
Morgan Stanley Société Générale
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. Dexia
Other TARP-related capital injections (528 banks) NETHERLANDS
IndyMac Bank, Pasadena, CA ING
Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, NV and Washington Aegon
Other FDIC-intervened banks (71 banks) SNS Reaal
UNITED KINGDOM Fortis
Lloyds BELGIUM
HBOS Ethias
RBS KBC
Bradford & Bingley Dexia 
Northern Rock Fortis
GERMANY IRELAND
Commerzbank / Dresdner Allied Irish Bank
HSH Nordbank Bank of Ireland
Bayer LB Anglo Irish Bank 
Hypo Real Estate
IKB
1. Until mid-September public authorities supported rescue operations in coordination with 
the private sector at institutions such as Bear Sterns, Countrywide, Merrill Lynch and AIG. 
They also made available credit lines and injected public capital into Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac. 2. Noteworthy in addition to the interventions in small banks, were those in Northern 
Rock and IndyMac.
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In EU countries the plans were designed within the framework of cer-
tain shared principles agreed by the Heads of State and of Govern-
ment and included the following: an extension of deposit guarantee 
systems, the provision of public guarantees for bank issues, the pur-
chase of bank assets and injections of public capital.
These initiatives managed to avert the collapse of financial markets 
but they did not restore confidence completely since the outlook for 
the sector remained very negative as a consequence of the deteriora-
tion in real activity and fresh losses linked to complex assets. At the 
same time, the first signs appeared of restrictions on the credit supply 
to the private sector, with the concomitant danger of feedback into 
the economic recession, even though credit stimulus measures had 
been included more or less explicitly in all the rescue programmes.
At the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, a new, more ambitious 
stage of the rescue plans began, in terms of both amount and scope. 
Several countries adopted public initiatives aimed at directly stimulat-
ing credit to the private sector. Further, attempts were made to re-
store confidence in financial institutions through measures to isolate 
and limit the losses which might arise on certain investments. To this 
end, initiatives were announced based on the creation of funds to 
purchase troubled assets and remove them from balance sheets 
(such as the public/private fund in Geithner’s plan), and schemes 
were set up based on the coverage by the public sector of losses on 
portfolios on banks’ balance sheets, in the style of the UK asset pro-
tection scheme. More recently, governments are exerting greater in-
fluence on the decisions adopted by those institutions which have 
received a significant volume of funds. Thus, although the formal na-
tionalisation of certain banks has not yet been considered, the re-
placement of preference shares by ordinary shares has been an-
nounced, which will give governments a greater ability to oversee 
such institutions.
BOX 1.1INTERNATIONAL BANK RESCUE PLANS (cont’d)
During this period, economic activity indicators took a strong turn for the worse, setting the 
scene for a recession in most developed countries and a strong deceleration in the emerg-
ing economies. Thus, for example, in the United States and in the United Kingdom the 
annualised quarterly GDP growth rate in Q4 dropped by around 6%, while the contraction 
in Japan was of the order of 12.1%. Against this backdrop, there was a substantial down-
ward revision of growth expectations for 2009, when global activity is expected to contract 
for the year as a whole, with very sharp declines in the main developed economies.
Inflation expectations also declined notably and, in some cases, such as Japan and the 
United States, prices are indeed expected to fall this year. In this scenario, the monetary 
policy of numerous central banks gave a more prominent role to stimulating activity while 
taking measures to ease financial strains. Indeed, some adopted unconventional meas-
ures such as liquidity facilities for troubled assets, loans for ailing non-bank financial insti-
tutions and, more recently, purchases of public and private debt by the Bank of England 
and the Federal Reserve.
In the emerging countries there were similar, though less marked, trends to those in the devel-
oped countries, thus confirming that the economies of the former are not immune to the ef-
fects of the economic crisis. These impacts were particularly strong in Eastern Europe, where 
growth in recent years was based on foreign-currency-denominated external financing to the 
private sector. 
In the euro area economic activity weakened sharply in Q4. Eurostat data show that euro 
area GDP fell 1.6% in quarter-on-quarter terms (down 1.5% on the same period in 2007), 
following the 0.3% drop in Q3. This fall reflects the impact of the international financial 
crisis through tighter financial conditions, low confidence levels and lower external de-
mand. These developments led to an expansion in GDP of 0.7% for the year as a whole, 
almost 2 pp lower than the 2007 figure (see Chart 1.2.A). Against this background, the 
ECB revised downwards its macroeconomic projections for this year and the next to 
growth rates of between –2.2% and –3.2% in 2009 and between 0.7% and –0.7% in 
2010.
Strong slowdown in activity 
and downward revisions of 
economic growth and 
inflation expectations…
… made for a looser 
monetary policy stance.
Some central banks 
adopted unconventional 
measures.
Emerging countries are not 
immune to the significant 
global economic and 
financial deterioration.
Economic growth in the 
euro area weakened notably 
in 2008 Q4 and 
macroeconomic projections 
for 2009 and 2010 were 
revised downwards.
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In Spain, at the tail-end of 2008 the weakness of economic activity became more acute. In 
2008 Q4, GDP posted a year-on-year fall of 0.7%, compared with a rise of 0.9% in Q3 (see 
Chart 1.2.A). In quarter-on-quarter terms it dropped by 1%, following the decline of 0.3% the 
previous quarter. For the first time since 1993, then, this meant two quarters of consecutive 
falls. Behind these developments was the contraction of domestic demand at a year-on-year 
rate of 2.8%, which was partly offset by net external demand, whose contribution to the rise 
in GDP (2.3 pp) was positive, since although there was a notable decline in exports (–7.9%), 
imports (–13.2%) fell on a greater scale. The fall-off in output was accompanied by a sharper 
rate of job destruction, which on EPA (Spanish Labour Force Survey) figures fell 3% in year-on-
year terms in Q4, placing the unemployment rate at end-2008 at 13.9%, more than 2.5 pp up 
on September (see Chart 1.2.B). The latest data indicate that this trend will continue during the 
early months of 2009.
The deterioration of the macroeconomic outlook and of consumer solvency perceived by fi-
nancial institutions has continued to be reflected in their more cautious credit standards. Oth-
The Spanish economy also 
went into recession, leading 
to a sharp rise in 
unemployment.
The further tightening of 
credit supply together with
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er factors such as funding difficulties on wholesale markets may have contributed to this, al-
beit to a lesser degree (according to the Bank Lending Survey - BLS). 1 At the same time, the 
demand for bank financing was once again contractionary during 2008 H2. In recent months, 
however, the cuts in official interest rates have begun to feed through to the cost of new busi-
ness, and in this way they have softened the tighter financial conditions. Against this back-
drop, the slowdown in financing to the non-financial private sector has continued. As a result, 
debt ratios tended to stabilise or fall slightly in 2008 Q4. However, the interest burden contin-
ued to increase owing to the higher average interest rates on outstanding loans, although the 
recent drop in EURIBOR rates will contribute over the coming months to reducing debt repay-
ments. The latest data on household net wealth, for 2008 Q3, show a decline in its share of 
gross disposable income, a trend which, judging by developments in financial asset and prop-
erty prices, is estimated to have continued until year-end.
In short, during 2008 H2 the Spanish economy experienced a very severe adjustment which 
has been reflected in a sharp rise in unemployment. As a result, the proportion of agents sub-
ject to a high degree of financial pressure increased, as manifest in the sizeable increase in the 
bad debts ratio. This situation will not foreseeably improve over the next few quarters in the 
light of the Banco de España’s latest macroeconomic projections of GDP growth of –3% in 
2009 and –1% in 2010.2
the decline in demand for 
financing have begun to see 
a stabilisation of household 
and corporate debt ratios. 
The interest burden 
continued to climb, although 
it will tend to fall over the 
coming months due to 
lower EURIBOR rates.
The recession is increasing 
the proportion of agents 
subject to a high level of 
financial pressure.
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
 EMPLOYMENT GROWTH RATE (b)
 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
%
B. LABOUR MARKET
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
2006 2007 2008
 EURO AREA (a)  SPAIN (a)
 EURO AREA (b)  SPAIN (b)
%
A. CHANGE IN GDP IN SPAIN
AND IN THE EURO AREA
MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS CHART 1.2
SOURCES: INE, Eurostat and Banco de España.
a. Quarter-on-quarter rate.
b. Year-on-year rate.
1. For more details see J. Martínez Pagés (2009), “Encuesta sobre Préstamos Bancarios en España: enero de 2009”, 
Boletín Económico, February, Banco de España. 2. For more details see “Spanish economic projections report” (2009), 
Economic Bulletin, April, Banco de España.
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2 Deposit institutions and other financial market participants
As analysed in Chapter 1, the environment in which financial institutions are operating is very 
adverse. First, instability continues on international financial markets, which has led to the 
need for public authorities in various countries to take control of many institutions, some of 
which large. Next, conditions on wholesale funding markets remain tough, even for institutions 
with good credit ratings. And further, the world economy is experiencing very hard times and 
there has been an unprecedented synchronisation of the cycle worldwide.
Spanish deposit institutions have been affected by the international financial crisis because of 
the evaporation of the wholesale funding channel, which in the years prior to the summer of 
2007 had contributed to funding a significant portion of growth in activity. This development, 
common to other euro area countries, has been alleviated by the measures adopted by the 
Spanish government regarding guarantees to bank debt issues and the fund for the acquisition 
of high-quality assets, and by the actions of the monetary authorities (see Chapter 3). Spanish 
deposit institutions have stepped up traditional deposit-taking, in particular time deposits, a 
process made easier due to their retail banking business model. However, stepping up deposit-
raising is hardly sustainable in the medium term and involves higher costs associated with these 
deposits, which put institutions’ results under pressure against a backdrop of lower activity.
Adding to the foregoing are the risks of a much weaker and uncertain macroeconomic situation 
in Spain and abroad. The difficulties of the real economy have resulted in significant rises in bad 
debts, whose management will be crucial this year and next. In this setting, together with lower 
demand for credit, institutions are more cautious regarding loan approvals and are discriminat-
ing to a greater degree across sectors and borrowers. This process of adjustment of bank 
balance sheets will be difficult and will take some time in the current circumstances. The high 
levels of returns, provisions and solvency marking the point of departure for the Spanish bank-
ing system do not mean this adjustment will be fully uniform across institutions or that it will not 
be costly, not affect results and capital ratios, and that it does not require strengthening certain 
courses of action, such as increasing efforts to rationalise cost structures to a greater extent.
Against this backdrop, the consolidated balance sheet of Spanish deposit institutions showed 
moderate growth of activity. Thus, total assets increased 8.8% in December 2008 (14.7% in 
December 2007; see Table 2.1). 
This performance of assets was due in particular to the slowdown in financing to the private sec-
tor (credit and fixed income), which posted growth of 7.8% in December 2008 (16.1% one year 
earlier). This is explained by demand as well as supply factors, partly due to institutions’ greater 
caution in extending credit in an adverse and uncertain context, in which bad debts are increas-
ing sharply, and, to a lesser extent, to institutions’ difficulties in obtaining wholesale funding.
Doubtful assets at the consolidated level1, which started out from very low levels (the total ratio 
at consolidated level stood at 0.78% in December 2007), continued to grow at a very high 
rate. That, coupled with the moderation in credit, took the bad debt ratio2 to 2.48% in Decem-
2.1 Deposit institutions
2.1.1 BANKING RISKS
The situation of international 
financial markets and the 
world economy remains 
very complex.
Spanish institutions have 
been affected by the closure 
of wholesale funding 
channels, partly alleviated 
by the authorities’ measures 
and the capture of deposits, 
with the latter process 
running the risk of petering 
out.
Compounding the foregoing 
are the risks of a worsening 
of the real economy, with 
bad debts posing a risk 
whose management will be 
crucial this year and next.
The growth of total assets 
slowed….
…due to lower growth in 
financing to the private 
sector.
Bad debts continued to rise 
sharply.
1. The FSR uses consolidated data, which include activities abroad by Spanish institutions through subsidiaries, but also 
other data relating to individual balance sheets. The latter, whose use is indicated in the text, and likewise in the charts (by 
means of the abbreviation ID), allows the analysis to focus on the risks associated with developments in the Spanish economy 
and makes for a more detailed analysis owing to the greater information available. 2. In the FSR, the terms bad debts and 
doubtful assets are used as synonyms, although technically doubtful debts include others in addition to impaired assets.
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ber 2008, confirming its significant rise, as had been foreseen in the last FSR. In a macroeco-
nomic context such as the current one, this trend will persist in the future. 
There was also a fall, in absolute values, in equities and investments, which is accounted for 
by strategies to reduce asset positions and by valuation effects at a very unfavourable time on 
stock markets worldwide. The relative weight of derivatives in total assets grew, due mainly to 
the rise in hedging transactions. 
ASSETS DEC-08
CHANGE
DEC-08/
DEC-07
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
DEC-07
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
DEC-08
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Cash and balances with central banks 102,967 16.2 2.7 2.9
Loans and advances to credit institutions 230,420 -7.6 7.5 6.4
General government 60,920 22.2 1.5 1.7
Other private sectors 2,368,807 7.1 66.7 63.6
Debt securities 394,056 10.8 10.7 10.9
Other equity instruments 70,939 -32.7 3.2 2.0
Investments 38,493 -29.2 1.6 1.1
Derivatives 196,097 113.0 2.8 5.4
Tangible assets 41,118 14.3 1.1 1.1
Other (a) 104,562 41.6 2.2 2.9
TOTAL ASSETS 3,608,379 8.8 100 100
MEMORANDUM ITEMS
Financing to private sector 2,505,261 7.8 70.1 69.4
Financing to general government 230,105 12.6 6.2 6.4
Total doubtful assets 75,434 238.8 0.7 2.1
Total doubtful assets ratio 2.48          170,0 (c) - -
Provisions for bad debts and country risk 54,402 29.4 1.3 1.5
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY DEC-08
CHANGE
DEC-08/
DEC-07
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
DEC-07
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
DEC-08
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Balances from central banks 133,783 45.5 2.8 3.7
Deposits from credit institutions 478,773 2.2 14.1 13.3
General government 93,079 4.1 2.7 2.6
Other private sectors 1,644,881 12.0 44.3 45.6
Marketable debt securities 631,154 -4.3 19.9 17.5
Derivatives 178,201 68.3 3.2 4.9
Subordinated debt 90,544 1.2 2.7 2.5
Provisions for pensions, tax and other 35,669 5.9 1.0 1.0
Other (a) 122,347 21.1 3.0 3.3
TOTAL LIABILITIES 3,408,431 9.7 93.7 94.5
MEMORANDUM ITEMS
Eurosystem net lending (b) 63,598 44.3 1.33 1.76
Minority interests 9,848 -9.5 0.3 0.3
Valuation adjustments relating to total equity -9,713 - 0.5 -0.3
Own funds 199,814 10.7 5.4 5.5
TOTAL EQUITY 199,948 -4.0 6.3 5.5
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 3,608,379 8.8 100 100
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET
Deposit institutions
TABLE 2.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. The remaining assets and liabilities entries not explicitly considered, including valuation
adjustments, are included in "Other".
b. Difference between funds received in liquidity providing operations and funds delivered
in absorbing operations.
c. Difference calculated in bp.
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As for liabilities, following the trend seen in previous FSRs, central bank deposits grew 
sharply. However, the liquidity obtained from the Eurosystem should be assessed by consid-
ering the net loan (the funds received in liquidity providing operations less those delivered in 
liquidity absorption operations). In a situation in which interbank markets are still not working 
normally and following the ECB’s decision on 15 October 2008 to satisfy all demand for li-
quidity at a fixed rate, the net loan to Spanish institutions remained on a rising course. 
However, its relative weight in consolidated balance sheets remains low (1.76% in Decem-
ber 2008) and is below the relative size of the Spanish banking system in the euro area as a 
whole.
The persisting dysfunctions on wholesale funding markets explain why the raising of funds via 
marketable securities posted a negative rate of change in December 2008 (–4.3%), while 
growth in subordinated debt was very moderate (1.2%). 
Using an extensive branch network that permits greater proximity to customers, Spanish institu-
tions have stepped up their deposit-taking, especially that of time deposits (which show growth 
of over 25%), which also afford a more stable financing structure than that based on sight de-
posits, notwithstanding the fact that greater competition in attracting such deposits is diminish-
ing such stability. Total private-sector deposits grew more sharply than credit (12% against 
7.1%, respectively, in December 2008). This contributed to easing institutions’ funding needs. 
However, the higher funding costs arising from the growing weight of time deposits will ad-
versely affect their income statements, and a tapering off of sharp deposit growth is discerni-
ble.
Own funds grew 10.7% in December 2008 in relation to the same period in 2007, which 
slightly increased their weight in bank balance sheets (5.5%). Practically all of the negative 
amount of equity valuation adjustments was attributable to exchange rate differences due to 
Spanish institutions’ business abroad.
The weight of business abroad in the consolidated balance sheets remained similar to that in 
December 2007 (21.7%). The current difficulties of the world economy mean the risk of busi-
ness abroad is also increasing. Although Spanish institutions have a presence, through their 
subsidiaries, in emerging countries, exposure to eastern European countries that are experi-
encing greater problems is currently very low.
Credit to the resident private sector in Spain continued to slow with a year-on-year growth 
rate of 6% in December 2008 compared with 11% in June 2008 (16.6% in December 2007 
and 25.8% in December 2006). The latest data (February 2009) confirm this trend (with an 
increase of 4.5%).
Lending is closely related to the economic cycle. Consequently, its gradual adjustment since 
2006 has been in response to a situation which, especially in the property sector, was starting 
to reflect lower growth. Similarly, easing can also be perceived on the credit supply side (see 
Chapter 1). For one thing, difficulties in obtaining funding on international wholesale markets 
persist. For another, and more importantly on the basis of the information available, institutions 
are exercising greater caution in assessing borrowers during an economic recession. Yet the 
dispersion in the rates of change in lending indicate that, although it slowed in general, this 
slowdown is not even across institutions (see Chart 2.1.A). 
The slowdown in credit to the resident private sector in Spain is proving sharper in sectors 
related to the real estate market (see Chart 2.1.B), and especially at construction and prop-
ECB financing continued on 
a growing trend but its 
weight in bank balance 
sheets is low...
… while deposits grew more 
sharply than credit.
The risk profile of business 
abroad only increased 
moderately and exposure to 
Eastern European countries 
is marginal.
Credit continued to slow,…
… due to lower demand 
and institutions’ greater 
caution in an unfavourable 
and uncertain 
macroeconomic context..
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erty development firms (it grew by 36% in June 2007, 21% in December 2007, 10.3% in June 
2008 and posted marginal growth of 2.9% in December 2008). That is to say, in sectors in 
which credit growth was sharper and in which a greater adjustment is currently taking place, 
the slowdown in credit was more pronounced. For non-financial corporations as a whole 
excluding construction and property development firms, growth at the end of 2006 (18.5%) 
and the current slower pace (10.6% in December 2008) reveal greater moderation. In a weak-
er economic situation, lending to households for purposes other than house purchase (basi-
cally consumption) has slowed sharply and even posted negative year-on-year rates of 
change in December 2008 (–2%), while in December 2006 it was growing at 19.9% (see 
Chart 2.1.B).
The slowdown in credit has not affected all borrowers to the same extent. At a time when 
default probabilities are rising, insofar as long-term relationships between institutions and their 
customers reduce information differences for both parties, the pace of loan approval for bor-
rowers who have been with an institution for longer may be expected to differ from that for 
customers of whom the institution has less knowledge.
The information for non-financial corporations obtained from the Central Credit Register (CCR) 
confirms this. Corporations that have seen a greater contraction of credit are those which have 
been receiving credit from the same institutions for fewer years (see Chart 2.2.A). These results 
generally remain the same when construction and development firms are separated from oth-
er corporations and when corporations are broken down by size. 
It can also be seen that the slowdown in total credit differs greatly depending on the number of 
lending banks a firm has (see Chart 2.2.B). Corporate credit increases significantly in year-on-year 
terms if a firm only works with one bank. The higher the number of banks a firm works with, the 
greater the slowdown in credit. This contrasts with developments around the height of the credit 
boom, when the credit which grew most was that extended by many banks. Possibly, at that time 
However, not all institutions 
or lending to the various 
sectors of activity showed 
the same intensity of 
growth…
…and nor were all 
customers affected to the 
same extent.
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the overriding aim was to gain market share, whereas customer knowledge and institutions’ com-
mitment to their customers, understood as a long-term relationship, currently prevails.
The pace of growth of the doubtful assets of banking business in Spain continued to quicken, 
but as argued in previous FSRs, in view of their low starting point (in December 2007 the ratio 
of total doubtful assets in business in Spain was 0.61%), the growth rates are affected by a 
question of scale. The doubtful loans ratio, which in December 2008 continued to grow sharp-
ly, stood at 2.4%.
The sharp increase in the doubtful assets ratio has been centred on credit to the resident pri-
vate sector in Spain, whose doubtful assets accounted in December 2008 for 94% of total 
assets. The doubtful assets ratio of credit to the resident private sector climbed from 0.84% in 
December 2007 to 3.3% in December 2008. The latest data (February 2009) indicate that this 
rising trend is holding (4.10%) and will persist in the coming quarters, largely due to the sharp 
turnaround in the business cycle. 
As a result of this rise in doubtful assets, the ratio for the resident private sector of business 
pursued in Spain recorded by the Spanish banking system, which departed from significantly 
lower levels, is now close to those of other banking systems in the developed world. In De-
cember 2008, the ratio stood at 3.6% for the French banking system and at 4% for Italy’s, two 
countries where, as in Spain, the traditional retail business model is predominant. Admittedly, 
the low doubtful assets ratios displayed by the Spanish banking system in recent years repre-
sented an exceptional situation in the international context. 
The rapid and sharp rise in doubtful assets is consistent with the strong pace at which activity 
is deteriorating and the substantial increase in the unemployment rate. Despite still being at 
default levels far removed from those of 1993, bad debts are strongly related to the phase of 
the business cycle, increasing when the latter turns down (see Chart 2.3.A). Nonetheless, the 
substantial cuts in interest rate levels are counteracting this effect by easing the interest burden 
on borrowers.
Doubtful assets continued 
to grow sharply,
… in step with the strong 
deterioration in the Spanish 
economy..
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Notwithstanding the close link between the business cycle and bad debts, it is the case that 
not all products or sectors incorporate the same levels of risk, and that not all institutions have 
taken on or managed such risk equally. The dispersion of doubtful asset ratios rises in reces-
sions, since the differences in the lending policy decisions taken in boom periods become 
clearly manifest when the economy worsens (see Chart 2.3.B). The breakdown of credit in 
terms of default in December 2008 reflects this, although the degree of dispersion is still far off 
that in 1993 (see Chart 2.3.C).
As has been reiterated in the FSRs to date, the construction and property development sec-
tors show a more pronounced and cyclical profile. That is to say, the attendant doubtful assets 
ratio is significantly above the average (around double) when the economy turns down. It is for 
these activities, in which credit grew most sharply, moreover, in the past, that bad debts have 
risen to a greater extent, largely exceeding the doubtful assets ratio for total credit (see Chart 
2.3.D). The related ratio for credit to construction and property development companies thus 
reached 5.71% in December 2008 (0.58% in December 2007). However, not all banks have 
As is habitual in downturns, 
the dispersion between 
institutions is increasing, 
though is still far off that 
seen in 1993.
The increase is sharp in the 
construction and property 
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financed construction and property development firms to the same degree of intensity (see 
Chart 2.4.A), which partly explains the dispersion of doubtful assets associated with these 
activities.
Further, even for those institutions with greater exposure to certain more cyclically sensitive 
products or sectors, there is dispersion in their doubtful assets ratios. This is so because dif-
ferent lending policies, despite the level of specialisation or of concentration, lead to different 
results. This can be seen on analysing the dispersion in the doubtful assets ratios of credit to 
construction and property development in 1993 for institutions with exposure to the sector 
that is greater than the average exposure of deposit institutions as a whole. For this sub-set of 
more exposed institutions, therefore, the dispersion in doubtful assets ratios remains high. The 
same can be seen in December 2008, although the dispersion is still considerably lower (see 
Chart 2.4.B).
The impact of the worse economic situation is also being felt in the doubtful assets ratio of 
credit to individuals, which rose from 1% in December 2007 to 2.8% in December 2008 (see 
Chart 2.3.D). Consumer credit, given its nature and the strong increase in unemployment, 
… but there is dispersion in 
the doubtful assets ratio 
vis-à-vis this sector not only 
due to differences in the 
degree of exposure, 
but also due to how the 
risks incurred have been 
managed and to the different 
lending policies applied.
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stood at a level (ratio of 4.5% in December 2008) and showed an increase in its doubtful as-
sets ratio (2.42 pp from December 2007) that was sharper than that for credit for house pur-
chase (2.33% in December 2008, 1.64 pp up on December 2007).
As noted in previous FSRs, the doubtful assets ratio for credit for house purchase (36% of 
total credit) has historically been low (at end-1993 it stood at 3.85%3, with the related ratio for 
total credit at 8.5%). The reasons for this have to do with the importance of home ownership 
for Spanish households, with the regulations in force concerning defaults and with the banking 
model developed in Spain. 
Housing is therefore a very important asset under household wealth and it is usually used as 
the habitual residence, in a country in which the percentage of owner-occupied housing 
stands at around 80%. The type of business pursued by institutions also contributes to doubt-
ful assets ratios being low for this type of product. First, because institutions select and care-
fully monitor borrowers, who usually use other products and services of the institution. And 
further, buy-to-rent business or the use of the mortgage guarantee to finance consumer cred-
it has not been common, as has been the case in other banking systems. Recently, institutions 
using the most advanced methodologies for measuring credit risk have adopted highly de-
tailed capital assignment systems, enabling them to better discriminate the risk each transac-
tion entails and, consequently, to assign capital more proportionately to the risk incurred (see 
Box 2.1). 
As previously noted, even under a general credit category, different business segments entail 
different risks. This is the case, as highlighted in the previous FSR, of mortgage credit ex-
tended to foreign residents.4 Although the weight of this item is small relative to credit for 
house purchase in Spain (slightly over 6%), the related doubtful assets ratio is significantly 
greater than that for other residents. In December 2008, the doubtful assets ratio for foreign 
residents was 12.5%, while that for other residents stood at 1.6%. There are also differences 
across institutions in this case, both in terms of their level of exposure and of their doubtful 
assets ratio (see Charts 2.4.C and D).
Higher doubtful assets ratios under mortgage lending to foreign residents is probably due to 
the fact that this is a relatively new business area for Spanish institutions, since the foreign 
resident population has grown sharply in recent years. Accordingly, banks have less knowl-
edge of these borrowers, revealing that financial innovation is not only a question of new 
products, but also of new business segments. That is to say, banks must not only be cautious 
when designing new and innovative financial products, but also when they move into unknown 
segments of activity, or into new geographical regions, even when they are marketing tradi-
tional products of which they have proven experience.
In sum, bad debts are strongly correlated to the business cycle. Also behind the behaviour of 
doubtful assets is the credit policy of each institution. This is so first, because not all banks 
have decided, for example, to grow with the same intensity in specific sectors of activity; and 
second, because even for those banks more exposed to a specific sector, there will be differ-
ences in doubtful assets based on their loan-extension and risk management and control 
policies. 
… and less so in housing 
credit, given the particular 
characteristics of mortgage 
financing in Spain..
However, under mortgage 
credit, too, there are riskier 
segments; though these 
have little weight in 
investment portfolios,…
… it is apparent that 
expanding into new sectors 
on which there is less 
information involves greater 
risks. In this case too, 
however, bad debts vary 
depending on the policies 
applied by each institution.
3. An approximate figure that draws on information from the CCR. 4. This category includes both resident emigrants 
and those other borrowers (e.g. retired foreigners from other European countries) who have taken up residence in Spain. 
It is not possible to discern the relative percentages for each of these groups within the overall total of foreign residents 
analysed in the FSR. This should be borne in mind when drawing conclusions from the analysis.
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Countercyclical provisions, which led the coverage ratios (loan loss provisions over doubtful 
assets) in December 2007 to close to 210%, have begun to be used, given the rise in bad 
debts. That, combined with the greater volume of doubtful assets, means that in December 
2008 the coverage ratios stood at slightly higher than 60%. It should be borne in mind that 
coverage ratios around these levels or even below them are quite common in times of reces-
sion and even in boom times in those countries which do not have countercyclical provisions. 
The amount of total doubtful assets (the denominator of the ratio) is not directly assimilable to 
a loss, since recoverability must be considered, especially in secured loans (such as mortgage 
loans for house purchase). Indeed, in recent years much of the credit that has grown most 
sharply is backed by such guarantees. The very mechanics of the system of countercyclical 
provisions introduce these oscillations into coverage ratios almost automatically. What is logi-
cal is that coverage should be very high during the upswing, and vice versa in the downturn. 
The intensity and depth of the current economic crisis in Spain and in most of the developed 
countries mean that a mechanism such as the general countercyclical provisions are not an 
absolute guarantee that institutions will face no difficulties. As in the credit slowdown, and in 
the structure of the lending portfolio and in developments in bad debts, there are differences 
across institutions in terms of the extensive use of these provisions, which respond to the in-
tensity of the specific provisions that must be made on the basis of the increase in their bad 
debts. In this respect, the general provision set aside by Spanish deposit institutions is de-
signed in a way that has enabled the effects arising from the rising bad debts to be cushioned, 
especially in the early stages when they rose sharply. But as there are differences in how bad 
debts impact each specific institution, there are also differences in the scope for the future use 
of this general provision.
As in other banking systems, another risk Spanish banks face is the persistence of the difficul-
ties on international wholesale markets. Although Spanish banks have not encountered sig-
nificant difficulties obtaining funding on the short-term markets (commercial paper), medium 
Countercyclical provisions 
have begun to be used in 
view of the increase in bad 
debts.
Given the intensity of the 
current crisis, there is no 
certainty that the 
countercyclical provisions 
will absolutely guarantee the 
absence of difficulties for 
institutions. 
Institutions’ difficulties in 
obtaining funding on the 
wholesale markets persist,…
In mortgage loan portfolios in Spain, the most advanced institutions 
have made a notable effort to achieve greater discrimination of risk in 
their internal models for credit risk measurement. As a result, the cal-
culation of capital requirements under CBE 3/2008 for these institu-
tions is producing highly granular capital distributions. 
The accompanying Chart provides, for a given portfolio and reporting 
date, an example which illustrates the relationship between transaction 
LTV, the origination date and the minimum required capital allocated 
internally by the institution on the basis of its internal parameters.
The x-axis shows the origination date of the mortgage loan and the 
y-axis indicates the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of that transaction at the 
reporting date, calculated using the exposure value at the reporting 
date and the appraisal value of the mortgaged asset at the origination 
date.
The colour code represents average values of the capital ratio as-
signed to the loans classified in the related cell (associated with a 
specific origination quarter and LTV range), based on deciles of the 
distribution of these average values. 
It can be seen that recent loans (associated with cells to the right) 
with higher LTVs (located in the upper cells) have, on average, higher 
capital allocations.
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and long-term wholesale funding continues to pose difficulties, while other international mar-
kets, such as those for securitisations, remain closed. 
When resorting to the international wholesale markets, Spanish institutions did so pursuing a 
funding policy based on medium and long-term maturities, and that despite the higher cost 
this entailed in comparison with shorter-dated funding. The maturities for medium and long-
term debt are concentrated in the period as from 2013 (almost 63%), while 9.3% of the out-
standing balance in January matures in 2009, 11.6% in 2010 and 16.4% between 2011 and 
2012 (see Chart 2.5.A). Spanish and international banks’ funding requirements have been 
eased in part by the decisions taken by governments and monetary authorities.
In relation to governments’ decisions, State guarantee arrangements have generally been set 
up for issues by banks. These plans have been used, to differing degrees of intensity, by insti-
tutions in several countries, including some from Spain. At the time of this report going to 
press, 15 institutions had made State-backed issues for an amount of €16,246 million. Unlike 
in other countries, the Spanish government decided to set in place a high-quality asset acqui-
sition programme, which has also contributed to easing these funding requirements. To date 
four auctions have taken place, allotting an amount of €19,341 million, with 53 institutions 
obtaining funding through this channel, albeit to differing degrees. 
Central banks have also been playing an active role in providing liquidity to the financial system 
since the difficulties began in the summer of 2007. Indeed, from 15 October 2008, given the 
persistence of the notable difficulties on euro area interbank markets, the Eurosystem took the 
decision to meet all demands for liquidity, at a fixed rate, without limits (see Chapter 3). Span-
ish institutions have resorted to ECB financing to a greater extent than in the past. Nonethe-
less, the proportion of financing obtained by the Spanish banking system from the ECB is 
slightly lower than the system’s weight in terms of its size. Likewise, the weight of the net loan 
relative to the system’s balance sheet remains at a low level (1.33% in December 2007 and 
1.76% in December 2008).
The measures adopted by the ECB and by different governments provide relative alleviation for 
institutions; but they nevertheless face a situation regarding their funding possibilities that 
should still be viewed as very complex and which entails a risk that needs to be properly man-
aged. What is more, these measures should be viewed as temporary, and may have been 
adopted at an unprecedented juncture marked concurrently by a crisis on international finan-
cial markets and a crisis affecting the real economy across countries in a synchronised fashion. 
The ideal solution, therefore, would be for the markets to move progressively back onto a 
normal footing, once again performing their economic function of channeling resources among 
the economy’s various agents. In any event, with the experience acquired during the current 
crisis, the proper management of liquidity risk is vital for the medium-term survival of any insti-
tution.
Spanish institutions are stepping up deposit-taking, reinforcing their traditional retail funding 
base. Retail banking based on long-term relationships with customers, favoured by customer 
proximity, allows deposit institutions a close relationship with customers. Spanish banks have 
a notable presence in the marketing of other saving products (certain types of insurance, pen-
sion funds and investment funds). The conjunction of these two characteristics means that, at 
a specific point in time, institutions can adjust the mix of products they offer, prioritising depos-
its at the expense of other alternative products for the placement of customers’ savings. The 
foregoing has translated into strong growth in time deposits (25% in December 2008). This 
change in tack on the liabilities side towards more traditional funding has further been accom-
… although Spanish 
institutions’ term structure is 
concentrated in the longer-
dated segments.
The measures taken by 
governments…
… and by central banks 
have partly eased the 
problem.
Spanish institutions have 
reformed their funding 
structure by raising time 
deposits, to which their 
banking model has proven 
conducive,…
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panied by the lower pace of growth of activity, meaning that the difference between the growth 
rates of lending and deposits turned negative in 2008 (see Chart 2.5.B). 
Nonetheless, the sharp expansion of time deposits cannot go on indefinitely, so there is a risk 
the process will peter out. Indeed, and despite the high growth rate of time deposits, the fig-
ures for recent months show some slowing in this rate. The growth of time deposits has been 
able, in part, to come about at the expense of a reduction in sight deposits. That entails 
higher financial costs for institutions, which exert downward pressure on their income at a time 
when it will not be offset by a greater volume of activity.
In an economic and financial setting as complex as that described in this FSR, with many in-
ternational financial institutions posting heavy losses and significant reductions in earnings, 
Spanish deposit institutions ended 2008 with group net income totalling €23,936 million (see 
Table 2.2).5 This largely reflects the retail banking model pursued by Spanish institutions, which 
allows for more recurring income, all the more so when compared with other banking models 
that are more dependent on the financial markets to generate their income. That said, Spanish 
institutions’ income statements are declining. This is due in the short term mainly to higher 
specific provisions owing to the increase in bad debts. In the medium term, the reason is that 
volumes of activity are not as high as in the past, since the deleveraging of the financial sector, 
and in general of the economy, both in Spain and worldwide, will be a permanent fixture. The 
longer the difficulties on international markets take to be resolved and the sharper the mac-
roeconomic deterioration proves, the greater the pressure will be on income statements and 
the higher the number of institutions that will experience these reductions.
… although that entails 
higher costs and there is a 
risk the process will peter 
out.
2.1.2 PROFITABILITY
Results are subject to 
downward pressure: in the 
short term due to higher 
provisioning requirements, 
and in the medium term to 
lower volumes of activity.
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5. The income statement presented in this FSR is consistent with the changes introduced by CBE 6/2008. The most 
notable change is that the newly defined net interest margin does not now include yields on equity instruments. The 
newly defined gross margin considers other operating results, while it considers the result on operating activity, which 
includes provisions and impairment losses on assets associated with loans. For readier comparison with previous FSRs, 
a net operating margin (the difference between gross income and operating expenses) has been introduced. Although 
the changes are not, given their size and impact, comparable with those introduced by CBE 4/2004, insofar as the figures 
for 2007 have been reconstructed taking into consideration the amendments of the new Circular, the year-on-year com-
parison should be viewed with some caution.
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Group net income fell by 21.7% in 2008 on 2007. The progressive worsening of the real 
economy over the course of 2008 and the persistence of the international financial crisis ex-
plain why Spanish deposit institutions’ results have trended downwards (in June 2008 they 
had fallen only by 2.5% on the same month in 2007). The decline in results, despite being the 
general trend, was not uniform across institutions, which reflects their different business strat-
egies and risk profiles (see Chart 2.6.A).
The decline in income can be explained by the fact that, despite the growth of net interest in-
come, fees and commissions were lower, the results on financial transactions worsened and 
provisions for loan losses increased, in a year in which bad debts surged (see Chart 2.6.B). 
The fall in group net income fed through to the ROE (12.9% in December 2008 against 19% 
in 2007) and to the ROA (0.76% in December 2008 compared with 1.05% in December 2007), 
although to differing degrees of intensity across institutions (see Chart 2.6.C).
The net interest margin grew at a rate of 14.1%, chiefly as a result of financial revenue stem-
ming from lending to customers. That offset higher financial costs, which grew especially in 
relation to the raising of deposits (greater competition among institutions). As noted, the fa-
vourable trend of the net interest margin highlights the recurring nature of the Spanish banking 
system’s income, the system’s dependence on income tied to financial market performance 
being limited. Based on the high proportion of loans at floating rates, this further reflects how 
Spanish institutions have been able to adjust interest rates more rapidly to the new setting (see 
Chart 2.6.D).
Income fell relative to 2007, 
albeit to differing degrees of 
intensity across institutions.
The return on assets and on 
equity fell.
The net interest margin 
grew, demonstrating the 
recurring nature of income, 
which depends little on 
securities market 
developments.
DEC-08 DEC-07 DEC-08
€m
% CHANGE
DEC-08/
DEC-07
% ATA % ATA
Financial revenue 174,667 21.1 4.96 5.52
Financial costs 117,235 24.9 3.23 3.70
Net interest income 57,432 14.1 1.73 1.81
Return from capital instruments 2,720 8.2 0.09 0.09
Share of profit or loss of entities accounted
for using the equity method 4,529 4.5 0.15 0.14
Net commissions 21,904 -0.7 0.76 0.69
Gains and losses on financial assets
and liabilities 8,497 -27.7 0.40 0.27
Other operating income 664 -14.1 0.03 0.02
Gross income 95,746 4.3 3.16 3.02
Operating expenses 43,660 7.5 1.40 1.38
Net operating income 52,086 1.8 1.76 1.65
Asset impairment losses
(specific and general provisions)
21,822 77.3 0.42 0.69
Provisioning expense (net) 3,965 90.8 0.07 0.13
Operating Profit 26,299 -28.5 1.27 0.83
Asset impairment losses
(assets other than loans and credits) 2,016 12.4 0.06 0.06
Income from disposals (net) 5,741 18.3 0.17 0.18
Profit before tax 30,024 -24.6 1.37 0.95
Net income 25,427 -20.5 1.10 0.80
MEMORANDUM ITEM
Income attributable to the controlling entity 23,936 -21.7 1.05 0.76
INCOME STATEMENT
Deposit institutions
TABLE 2.2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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However, from a medium-term perspective, against a background of significant interest rate cuts, 
but one in which competition among banks to raise deposits persists, the net interest margin might 
be subject to downward pressure. Further, in a low interest rate scenario, the cost of liabilities has 
a floor, which also influences the narrowing of margins. Moreover, if activity moderates to a greater 
extent than in the recent past, the pressure on results in the coming years will increase.
The favourable performance of the net interest margin did not pass through in full to the gross 
margin (growth of 4.3%). Fees and commissions were flat, reflecting the sluggishness of finan-
cial markets and the greater emphasis on raising deposits (fewer fees and commissions from 
securities services and from the marketing of non-bank financial products), along with a slow-
er pace of activity (flatness of fees and commissions from collection and payment services). 
However, funding costs tend 
to exert downward 
pressure, which will not be 
offset by greater activity.
Fees and commissions 
remained flat and the results 
on financial operations 
declined.
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a. Marginal interest rates are those established in transactions initiated or renewed during the month prior
to that of reference, such transactions being weighted by their volume.
The asset-weighted marginal rates include, inter alia, those applied to housing and consumer finance
and credit to non-financial corporations, while the liabilities-weighted ones include, inter alia, fixed-term
deposits and repos.
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The reduction in results on financial transactions was essentially due to the difficulties on inter-
national financial markets, and partly to sales of holdings in 2007. However, in the case of 
Spanish deposit institutions, the results on financial transactions arising from the trading book 
were, despite falling, positive in 2008. This highlights the fact that not only is the valuation 
principle (fair value in this case) applied signifiant, but also the instruments making up the port-
folio and the business model developed by institutions.
Operating expenses grew by 7.5%, a still-high rate and one, in any event, higher than that of 
the growth margin, which accounts for the weak growth of the net operating margin (1.8%). 
The growth of operating expenses was observable in their three main components: staff costs 
(6.7%, with a relative weight of 58%), administrative expenses (9.2%) and depreciation (6.2%). 
Combined with the moderate increase in gross income, this made for a slight worsening in the 
efficiency ratio (45.6% against 44.25% in December 2007). The improvement in efficiency, 
which remains at a very high level, and the reduction in operating expenses as a proportion of 
ATA were checked in 2008 (See Chart 2.7.A).
Efficiency deteriorated 
slightly.
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Against a backdrop of higher financial costs, lower volumes of activity and greater loan loss 
provisioning, rigour in the control of costs should be stepped up. The rate of expansion of 
branch offices and employees, which has been very strong in recent years (see Chart 2.7.B), 
is out of step with the new environment facing the banking sector. The specific strategies 
should be defined by institutions, but the necessary restructuring of the sector will mean that 
different options for the rationalisation of operational and structural costs must be analysed. 
Downsizing the network by means of fewer branch offices, increasing the productivity of those 
remaining or devising transversal optimisation processes across institutions are some of the 
options for consideration. A thoroughgoing cost rationalisation process, within each institution 
and across institutions, is necessary in order to ease the pressure on the results and profitabil-
ity of institutions in the coming years. However, quite possibly for a large number of institutions, 
the necessary and unavoidable management of costs will not be enough to achieve sufficient 
profitability in the medium-term; accordingly, it may be necessary to consider other restructur-
ing processes that go beyond individual management of cost structures.
Operating results, which include asset impairment losses arising from lending (general and 
specific provisions), and other provisions (basically for tax, pension funds and contingent risks 
and commitments), fell by 28.5% in relation to the December 2007 figure. 
The reason was the sharp increase in the general and specific provisions, which grew by 
77.3%. Although this growth differed across institutions (see Chart 2.7.C), these provisions 
consume an increasingly larger portion of the net operating margin (see Chart 2.7.D). This is 
due to the increase in specific provisions, given the strong rise in bad debts in 2008, cush-
ioned only in part by general provisions, which some institutions have begun to use (the gen-
eral provision, at the consolidated level, declined by 21.4% in December 2008). Nonetheless, 
some of the increase in the provisions is due to the fact that certain institutions have increased 
them in the face of an adverse and uncertain economic climate. It should be borne in mind that 
the timetables set under Spanish regulations in relation to specific provisions refer to a mini-
mum that institutions must meet; consequently, they may set aside provisions above these 
minimum levels if they deem it necessary.
When the results of large Spanish institutions are compared with those of their counterparts in 
banking systems in the developed world, the direct impact of the international financial crisis is 
apparent. This is specifically so in the case of investment in highly complex and relatively opaque 
investment products that have recorded notable losses, which translates into a sizeable impact 
on income statements or into notable reductions in profits. For those large Spanish deposit 
institutions which, like other Spanish entities, did not invest in these products, no losses were 
recorded in 2008, and results diminished to only a modest extent6 (see Chart 2.8.A).
On the stock market the performance of the banking sector was, despite some correction in 
recent weeks, most adverse, and the main institutions saw their stock market capitalisation fall 
significantly. Their market value relative to their book value reflected this notable correction. 
Throughout 2008, the stock market performance of the biggest Spanish institutions was bet-
ter than that of their peers in other banking systems (see Chart 2.8.B), due largely to the direct 
impact of the international financial crisis on the latter. Nonetheless, since early 2009 this dif-
ference has disappeared (see Chart 2.8.B), which probably reflects the general bleak macr-
oeconomic outlook.
Institutions should seek to 
rationalise their cost 
structures to a greater 
extent,…
… since loan loss provisions 
will continue to exert 
downward pressure on 
income statements.
The results of large Spanish 
institutions were better than 
in other banking systems in 
the developed world,…
… as reflected in their better 
stock market performance 
to end-2008; however, the 
difference is being erased 
as a result of the general 
deterioration in the 
economy..
6. It should be borne in mind, moreover, that institutions in some countries have made use of the asset reclassification 
recently permitted by the accounting authorities (IASB). That has contributed to limiting how the losses on such assets 
are reflected in income statements for 2008.
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In terms of default risk derived from CDS spreads, the trend for the biggest institutions in bank-
ing systems in the developed world, including Spain’s, is relatively similar, with Spanish banks 
around the average. 
The end-2008 solvency ratios of Spanish deposit institutions as a whole substantially ex-
ceeded the regulatory minimum requirements, in a year in which EU Directives 2006/48/EC 
and 2006/49/EC (based on Basel II) were transposed to Spanish law (CBE 3/2008). The total 
solvency ratio in December 2008 stood at 11.3%, 67 bp more than a year earlier, while the tier 
1 ratio was 8.4%, representing a year-on-year increase of 89 bp (see Chart 2.9.A). 
The improvement in the total solvency ratio and in the tier 1 ratio was relatively widespread across 
institutions. However, in addition to other considerations, the management strategies followed by 
each institution are also reflected in their regulatory capital ratios, so there are substantial differ-
ences between them insofar as their regulatory capital levels are concerned (see Chart 2.9.A), as 
well as in the quality of that capital. The latest solvency data available show that the total solvency 
ratio of one institution did not meet the required minimum level for regulatory purposes (Box 2.2).
The substantial slowdown in lending brought a decline in risk-weighted assets and, conse-
quently, in capital requirements (–2.1%, against 12.7% in December 2007). The downturn in 
requirements for credit risk (–10.1%), which have a weight of nearly 88% (see Chart 2.9.C), 
negatively affected the behaviour of total capital requirements, partly offset by the introduction 
of new requirements for operational risk and by temporary requirements.7 (Box 2.3).
The growth of total own funds slowed to a rate of 4.1%, down 3 pp from December 2007, 
impacted by the sharp moderation in tier 1 capital, which went from growth of 17.8% in De-
cember 2007 to 9.5% a year later, and by a significant fall in tier 2 capital (–21.6%), partly offset 
by the smaller deductions (see Chart 2.9.D).
2.1.3 SOLVENCY
Solvency ratios remain well 
above the minimums,…
… and requirements 
decreased due to the slower 
lending,…
… as did, to a lesser extent, 
own funds.
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7. As a temporary requirement, institutions using internal models have to meet additional requirements set at 90% and 
80% of the requirements that would apply to them under Circular 5/1993 in 2008 and 2009, respectively. The actual 
purpose is to set floors to the potential decrease in capital requirements.
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International comparison of the solvency levels of the larger institutions shows that the position 
of Spanish banks, measured in terms of tier 1 ratio, is in line with that of peer institutions in 
other European banking systems. The comparison is more favourable for Spanish institutions 
when general provisions are considered (see Chart 2.10.A). Also, it should be kept in mind that 
the governments of most EU countries have injected capital, via diverse instruments, in their 
financial institutions, particularly in the larger ones (Box 1.1).
International comparison of capital ratios should be interpreted with some caution because the 
transposition of EU directives can give rise to particularities when they are specifically applied. 
Thus Spanish legislation is more demanding and stricter than if the directives were applied 
directly. For example, in regard to requirements for higher quality capital and, in particular, that 
included in the calculation of the tier 1 ratio, Spanish legislation sets additional limits on eligible 
equity instruments issued by foreign subsidiaries and, furthermore, it limits the preference 
shares included in tier 1 capital to 30% of total tier 1 capital.
The solvency of the larger 
Spanish institutions is in line 
with that of their 
counterparts in other 
European countries,…
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The international financial crisis has shown how institutions with strong capital ratios, including 
that for the highest quality capital, have encountered notable difficulties requiring the interven-
tion, in one form or another, of the public authorities. Among other shortcomings, this reflects 
the insufficiency of capital for covering the risk associated with certain assets, particularly for 
some of those included in the trading book which have a large credit-risk component. This is 
reflected in the BCBS’s work on the treatment of the trading book.
The degree of leverage (own funds to total assets) of financial institutions is a highly significant 
variable. In a recent communication, the BCBS indicated that practices of this type, among 
others, will have to be taken into account when assessing institutions’ solvency requirements. 
… while their leverage is 
lower,…
On 28 March 2009 the Executive Commission of the Banco de Es-
paña decided to replace the board of directors of Caja Castilla-La 
Mancha (CCM) and designate three provisional administrators, in ap-
plication of Law 26/1988 on the discipline and intervention of credit 
institutions.
Also, after notification by the Banco de España to the Ministry of 
Economy and in response to the need to provide extraordinary fi-
nancing to enable the institution to overcome its temporary liquid-
ity difficulties, on 29 March an extraordinary meeting of the Council 
of Ministers approved Royal Decree-Law 4/2009 authorising the 
State to grant guarantees deriving from such funding as may be 
provided by the Banco de España to CCM, up to a maximum of €9 
billion. 
These decisions were taken after it became clear that a “private” so-
lution could not be reached to CCM’s problems within the framework 
of the savings bank Deposit Guarantee Fund. In any event, the Banco 
de España’s action aimed to prevent the institution’s progressive de-
terioration from resulting in a crisis of confidence in it, a market con-
vulsion and, ultimately, higher costs for taxpayers. These preventive 
measures have enabled CCM to continue operating normally and 
meet its payment obligations and commitments, assuring the posi-
tion of its depositors and creditors. 
Caja Castilla-La Mancha is a solvent institution as it has a positive net 
worth, i.e. its net assets exceed its debts. However, the institution 
was in serious difficulty. First, its regulatory capital ratio was below the 
required minimum of 8%. At the same time, its financial outlook was 
unfavourable, since it had substantial doubtful assets and its profits 
(the first line of defence when difficulties appear) were scant, both in 
terms of total assets as a percentage of equity. 
The Banco de España’s decision is fully consistent with the action 
taken on other occasions to deal with other institutions in difficulty, 
and with the principles established in the motion passed in Parlia-
ment on 17 March on the strategy for restructuring the Spanish finan-
cial system.
ACTION OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA REGARDING CAJA CASTILLA-LA MANCHA BOX 2.2
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Regardless of the yardstick used, the data on Spain’s larger institutions show them to be 
among the least leveraged in comparison with those of other European banking systems (see 
Chart 2.10.B).
However, while Spanish deposit institutions have capital ratios above the regulatory minimums 
and they compare favourably with large institutions in other countries, there is no doubt that 
the environment in which they have to operate in the coming quarters will be very difficult. 
Therefore, irrespective of the role played by the supervisor, institutions have to carefully judge 
the regulatory capital position which will allow them, acting prudently and in the medium term, 
to face the risks to which they are exposed.
In Europe, 2008 was a complicated year for the insurance sector. Direct exposures to complex 
structured products and to the private fixed-income securities of financial institutions with seri-
ous difficulties in 2008 are limited8, but the international crisis and the extremely complicated 
economic situation have weakened the position of the sector. The stock market performances 
and the behaviour of risk premiums implicit in the CDS spreads of the main European compa-
nies reflect these difficulties. In 2009 the risks associated with the persistence of the financial 
crisis and with an adverse economic situation remain a threat.
… which does not mean 
that the solvency position of 
Spanish institutions as a 
whole does not have to be 
carefully assessed.
2.2 Insurance 
companies, investment 
funds and pension funds
2008 was a complicated 
year for the European 
insurance sector,…
CBE 3/2008 adapts Spanish legislation to the Basel II rules, trans-
posing the EU directives in this respect. One of the main aims of the 
Basel II Accord is to make capital requirements more sensitive to risk, 
and, to this end, the range of risks to be covered has been extended 
and institutions are permitted, upon authorisation from the Banco de 
España, to use their own calculation methodologies (internal models) 
to determine the minimum capital requirements to be met.
The requirements are classified into four broad groups: those for 
credit, counterparty, dilution and delivery risk (with a weight in De-
cember 2008 of 88%, practically all for credit risk); those for liquida-
tion risk (barely significant); those for market and exchange risk 
(weight of 3%); those for operational risk (weight of 8%); and other 
(weight of 1%). 
As regards credit risk requirements, 65% arise from the standardised 
approach, and the other 35% from the internal ratings based (IRB) 
approach. In terms of the exposures subject to requirements for 
credit risk, these percentages are 60% and 40%, respectively. Ten 
institutions use the IRB approach, two of which are subsidiaries of 
foreign banks. Within the IRB approaches, most noteworthy by type 
of obligor are the retail portfolio, which consists of lending to individu-
als (both consumer credit and residential mortgage loans) and SMEs 
(exposure of less than €1 million), with a weight of 41% (24% accord-
ing to requirements), other corporates (which include all other com-
panies and businesses whose debt to the institution exceeds €1 mil-
lion), with a weight of 45% (61% on the basis of requirements) and 
financial institutions, with a weight of 10% (5% in terms of require-
ments). For institutions applying the standardised approach, 39% of 
exposures are weighted at 100% (exposures to large firms and SMEs 
of more than €1 million, among others), 18% at 75% (SMEs with 
bank debt of less than €1 million to the institution and consumer 
credit) and 16% at 35% (residential mortgage loans with LTV below 
80%). 
The scant weight of the exposure subject to external credit ratings 
under the standardised approach and the greater sensitivity of the 
parameters which determine capital requirements under the IRB ap-
proach (PD, but also LGD and EAD) mean that the distribution of 
capital requirements may vary significantly across groups of institu-
tions during a business cycle, depending on the approach (standard-
ised or IRB) applied by each institution. The procyclicality of Basel II 
capital requirements is analysed in more detail in Chapter 3.
With regard to requirements for market risk and exchange risk, two 
methodologies may be distinguished: the standardised approach 
and internal models. The latter are of little importance in terms of both 
the number of institutions using them (4) and their relative weight 
within the requirements for this type of risk (26%). 
Operational risk requirements can be calculated by the basic indica-
tor approach, the standardised and alternative standardised ap-
proaches or the advanced approach. In December 2008, 15 institu-
tions were using the standardised or alternative standardised 
approach and only two (again, subsidiaries of foreign banks) were 
using internal models. In terms of volume, the basic indicator ap-
proach accounts for 68% of total requirements, against 32% for the 
standardised or alternative standardised approach.
CBE 3/2008 ON THE DETERMINATION AND CONTROL OF OWN FUNDS AND ITS IMPACT ON CAPITAL 
REQUIREMENTS
BOX 2.3
8. Financial Conditions and Financial Stability in the European Insurance and Occupational Pension Fund Sector 
2007-2008, CEIOPS, December 2008.
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The Spanish insurance sector shares some of these elements of risk with the rest of Europe. 
Nevertheless, as noted in previous FSRs, equity securities have a very low weight (around 
2.5%) in the balance sheets of Spanish insurance companies, and this explains why they are 
less sensitive to equity markets. The international financial difficulties interact with the difficult 
situation besetting the real economy, which puts downward pressure on premiums in the sec-
tor and on insurers’ profits and solvency, which nonetheless remains high. The latest available 
data indicate that the solvency margin is around 180% for life and 330% for non-life.
In the life segment, demand will probably trend downwards, and at the same time this line will 
have to adjust to the stronger competition for household and corporate savings from banks 
and to the interest rate environment. In non-life, the weaker economic activity affects home 
multi-risk insurance linked to house purchase mortgages, unemployment insurance due to the 
sharp rise in job losses and automobile insurance due to lower sales and the fewer policies 
taken out, along with the more intense competition between companies amidst decreasing 
claims. Also, against a background of sharply increasing defaults, claims in credit and surety-
ship insurance are increasing significantly.
The international financial crisis has adversely affected investment funds. Their net assets de-
creased progressively in 2008 (-29.8% in December 2008). This fall in net assets was caused 
by a large net outflow of funds (see Chart 2.11.A) due to the trend in returns, which in 2008 
was negative for nearly all types of investment funds (see Chart 2.11.B), and to the heightened 
competition for private-sector savings. 
Nearly all types of pension funds also recorded negative returns in 2008, although, given their 
characteristics as a product more focused on long-term saving, the decrease in their net as-
sets was not so significant (year-on-year fall of 9.3% in December 2008; Chart 2.11.A).
… and also for the Spanish 
insurance sector, which, 
although less exposed to 
the stock markets,…
… has to face a more 
adverse economic situation.
Investment funds report 
significant falls in net 
assets,…
… which were milder in the 
case of pension funds.
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3 Other issues
In the last year, the leading central banks around the world have undertaken many actions 
targeted at combating the effects of the international financial crisis. These actions have in-
cluded measures which fall within conventional monetary policy and others which can be de-
scribed as unconventional (see Box 3.1). Noteworthy among the former are widespread reduc-
tions in official rates which in some cases have left no further leeway for additional rate cuts. 
Thus, the reference rates of the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan 
stood, at the cut-off date of this report, at 0.00% - 0.25%, 1.00% and 0.10%, respectively. The 
volumes of liquidity injected into the financial system have also increased significantly.
The ECB reduced the minimum rate for the main refinancing operations to 1.25% in April. 
Furthermore, in order to place the euro area money market back on a normal footing, in March 
2008 it decided to conduct three-month and six-month longer-term supplementary refinanc-
ing operations, without affecting the regular three-month operations. Subsequently, in Sep-
tember it introduced a special refinancing operation with a maturity of one month which coin-
cides with the minimum reserve maintenance period.
The decision was also taken to change the allotment procedure of tenders. From October 
2008 tenders have been carried out through a fixed-rate procedure with full allotment for all 
maturities. The ECB has undertaken to maintain this exceptional measure at least until the 
beginning of 2010, at the same time as it will continue with the current frequency and maturity 
profile of supplementary refinancing operations.
Another particularly important measure was the expansion of the list of assets eligible as col-
lateral in Eurosystem monetary policy operations (15 October 2008), which will remain in force 
until the end of 2009. The expansion comprised, on the one hand, the inclusion of assets 
which had not been eligible until then, and, on the other hand, the lowering of the credit rating 
threshold. The new assets added to the list were: (i) marketable debt instruments denominated 
in the US dollar, the British pound and the Japanese yen, provided that they are issued and 
held or settled in the euro area and that the issuer is established in the European Economic 
Area; (ii) debt instruments issued by credit institutions, which are traded on certain non-regu-
lated markets, including certificates of deposits; (iii) subordinated debt instruments when they 
are protected by an acceptable guarantee; (iv) fixed-term deposits of counterparty institutions 
in the Eurosystem; and euro-denominated syndicated credit claims governed by English and 
Welsh law. The eligibility of the latter was terminated in November 2008. Also, the credit 
threshold of the Eurosystem for assets eligible as collateral was lowered from A- to BBB- or an 
equivalent grade, for marketable and non-marketable assets, with the exception of asset-
backed securities which maintain a credit threshold of A-.
The exceptional nature of the international financial crisis has prompted various organisations 
to analyse its causes and to propose different measures (see Box 3.2). From the standpoint of 
capital regulations of credit institutions, Basel II was not in force in any country at the onset of 
the crisis. This does not mean that the Basel Committee (BCBS) is not revising the Accord in 
the light of the lessons learnt.
Procyclicality is among the issues under debate. The financial system is procyclical: during 
booms agents tend to underestimate risks, while when the cycle changes they tend to react 
abruptly. This behaviour is called procyclical because it amplifies the economic cycle. The 
3.1 Anti-crisis measures 
adopted by the European 
Central Bank
Central banks have 
significantly cut reference 
rates and increased the 
amounts injected.
The ECB cut the minimum 
rate and introduced 
supplementary operations, 
increasing the liquidity 
injected…
… at a fixed rate and with 
full allotment,…
… and expanded the list of 
eligible collateral, including 
assets not previously eligible 
and lowering the acceptable 
quality threshold.
3.2 Procyclicality of 
Basel II: measurement and 
correction
The procyclicality of capital 
requirements is still under 
debate.
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Last year the leading central banks around the world implemented 
initiatives which are not included in the conventional monetary policy 
toolbox. These measures are a response to an exceptional situation 
in which the leeway for additional rate cuts has been used and fail-
ures in the monetary policy transmission mechanism must be over-
come against a backdrop of uncertainty and faltering confidence. 
This box focuses on the Federal Reserve (the Fed), the Bank of Eng-
land and the Bank of Japan, although other central banks also adopt-
ed unconventional measures.
The Fed arranged swap lines with many central banks to provide 
them the dollar liquidity they require to meet their programmes to 
inject foreign currency liquidity. The Fed, with the guarantee of the 
Treasury, began in September 2008 to buy from market-makers 
the short-term debt which had been issued by Fannie Mae, Fred-
die Mac and Federal Home Loan Banks, to reduce the cost of refi-
nancing it. Similarly, in January 2009 a Treasury-backed pro-
gramme was launched to buy assets, in order to stimulate the 
granting of credit to ultimate borrowers, in general, and home pur-
chase loans, in particular. $100bn of debt issued by Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac and Federal Home Loan Banks will be purchased; 
and $500bn (extended to $1.25tn in March 2009) of mortgage-
backed assets guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie 
Mae. It has also implemented various facilities which are also 
backed by the Treasury:
1 Term Securities Lending Facility, March 2008: exchange of 
assets with institutions. Weekly auction of one-month loans of 
Treasury assets to market-markers against other less liquid 
assets.
2 Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund 
Liquidity Facility, September 2008: loans without recourse to 
institutions to buy asset-backed commercial paper from 
money market mutual funds. The aim is to assist these funds 
to meet demand for redemptions and to foster liquidity in 
money markets in general.
3 Commercial Paper Funding Facility, October 2008: purchase 
of quality unsecured or asset-backed commercial paper di-
rectly from eligible issuers on the primary market through a 
public special purpose vehicle (SPV) financed by the Fed in 
order to provide them liquidity.
4 Money Market Investor Funding Facility, November 2008: 
funding for a series of SPVs set up with the private sector to 
purchase certain short-term assets from given US money 
market investors, to serve as a source of liquidity for them.
5 Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, March 2009: 
three-year loans without recourse and the need for an auc-
tion (global amount of up to $1tn) to holders of AAA-rated 
asset-backed securities by newly originated loans to the real 
sector of the economy. Its objective is to increase the avail-
ability of credit and to support economic activity by facilitat-
ing the issuance of securitisations backed by a broad range 
of loans.
Another recent initiative of the Fed (March 2009) has been to begin a 
policy to buy medium and long-term government debt on the sec-
ondary market (overall amount of up to $300bn).
The Bank of England maintained between April 2008 and January 
2009 the Special Liquidity Scheme, a facility to swap high-quality il-
liquid assets for Treasury bills with credit institutions. The risk of loss-
es remains with the credit institutions. The initial period of the opera-
tions was one year which may be renewed up to a maximum of three 
years. In September 2008 it also began to inject dollar liquidity into 
the overnight market and then extended the maturity to one week, 
one month and three months (from October auctions have been con-
ducted at a fixed rate with full allotment). 
Also, in January 2009 it launched the Asset Purchase Facility in order 
to increase the availability of corporate credit. It is a facility to pur-
chase private assets totalling £50bn whereby for the time being it 
acquires high-quality commercial paper on the primary and second-
ary markets, although it plans to buy corporate bonds on the second-
ary market and is studying the possibility of acquiring bank paper is-
sued with a guarantee of the State, syndicated loans and asset-backed 
securities. This programme is guaranteed by the Treasury. Finally, in 
March 2009 it began to buy medium and long-term government debt 
on the secondary market.
In September 2008 the Bank of Japan began to inject dollar liquid-
ity into its counterparties (from October 2008 at a fixed rate with 
full allotment) and in January 2009 it implemented a programme to 
purchase private assets. it has begun to purchase unsecured or 
asset-backed commercial paper for an overall amount of up to JPY 
3tn and JPY 1tn, respectively. Unlike the Fed and the Bank of Eng-
land, the Bank of Japan does not have the guarantee of its Treas-
ury.
In spite of the unconventional measures adopted, the economic and 
financial situation has not yet returned to normal. Continuing to use 
unconventional measures, thus increasing the lending activity of cen-
tral banks, involves raising their on-balance sheet risk. In order to 
lower this risk, Treasury support is an alternative (the Fed and the 
Bank of England), but at the same time it poses a threat for the inde-
pendence of the central bank. In the particular case of the Eurosys-
tem, the non-existence of a single tax authority makes this possibility 
difficult.
BOX 3.1UNCONVENTIONAL MEASURES ADOPTED BY LEADING CENTRAL BANKS
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In October 2007 the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Gover-
nors asked the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to analyse the causes 
of the financial turbulence which had begun in July that year. They 
also requested the FSF include recommendations to increase the re-
silience of markets and institutions.
The FSF published its report in April 2008 and included a wide-rang-
ing list of recommendations in five areas: i) strengthened prudential 
oversight of capital, liquidity and risk management; ii) enhancing 
transparency and valuation of financial products; iii) changes to cred-
it rating agencies; iv) strengthening the authorities’ responsiveness to 
risks; and v) arrangements between regulators for dealing with stress 
in the financial system.
During 2008 the financial crisis intensified, ultimately affecting the 
emerging economies. For this reason, the decision was taken for the 
leaders of the G-20, which includes the G7 countries and emerging 
countries, to meet at the Washington Summit on 15 November 2008 
to seek global solutions to the crisis. In the final statement, the G20 
leaders undertook to cooperate to identify and implement the reforms 
required to improve the functioning and solvency of the world’s finan-
cial systems. A detailed plan of action was included with immediate 
tasks to be completed by the end of March 2009 and others to be 
finished in the medium term. Most of the points included in the action 
plan had already been covered by the FSF’s recommendations and 
were being addressed by international banking, securities and insur-
ance committees, accounting regulators and the finance industry. 
However, other points involve new work.
On 2 April 2009 the G20 leaders met again at the London Summit1 to 
review the work that should have been finished and the validity of the 
decisions taken previously. The final statement notes that the action 
plan agreed in Washington is being implemented, as are, in particular, 
the following specific measures: to strengthen prudential regulation 
and international cooperation; to extend regulation to all systemically 
important financial institutions, instruments and markets; to effec-
tively oversee credit rating agencies; and to improve compensation 
systems and accounting regulation. Furthermore, the decision was 
taken to establish a new Financial Stability Board, which replaces the 
FSF and will include all G20 countries, FSF members, the European 
Commission and Spain.
In the area of banking regulation, the Basel Committee (BCBS) is 
entrusted with implementing the FSF’s recommendations and the ac-
tion plan included in the G20 statement in November and confirmed 
in the statement in April. To that end, it established as priorities in its 
work programme: strengthening capital requirements; implementing 
and improving liquidity risk management; promoting improvements in 
institutions’ risk management and in their supervision; enhancing 
transparency and market information, improving supervisory coop-
eration for international banks and, finally, strengthening the macro-
prudential approach of supervision.
In January 2009 the BCBS published a package of measures for 
public consultation. Under pillar 1, it proposes increasing the capital 
requirements of certain complex products such as resecuritisations 
and liquidity lines to ABCP conduits, and instruments included in the 
trading book. Under pillar 2, standards are proposed to promote 
more rigorous supervision and management of risk concentrations, 
off-balance sheet exposures, securitisations and related reputational 
risks. Also proposed are improvements to valuations of complex in-
struments, the management of liquidity risks and firm-wide stress 
testing practices. Finally, under pillar 3, enhancements are proposed 
for market disclosure requirements for securitisations and off-balance 
sheet vehicles. Also, in December 2008 the BCBS published a report 
reviewing the regulations on the resolution of troubled institutions and 
their cross-border application.
The BCBS has not forgotten the tasks which must be completed in 
the medium term. The first objective is for institutions to have higher 
liquidity and capital buffers. Additionally, it aims to promote healthier 
risk management and corporate governance practices, to limit risk 
concentration at and among credit institutions, and to strengthen 
market information.
In Europe a parallel process was followed to that undertaken globally. 
Thus, in October 2007 the ECOFIN agreed various actions and drew 
up a work programme with a “roadmap” for negotiating the turmoil, 
with similar objectives to those described above. 
As a result of the G20 Summit, the Economic and Finance Commit-
tee, as required by the ECOFIN, drafted a new work programme with 
the aim of preparing the contribution of the European presidency to 
the forthcoming G20 summits.
The CEBS, as the committee of banking supervisors, also adapted its 
work programme to embrace the points of the G20 action plan which 
affect it, working, among other issues, on colleges of supervisors, 
employee compensation, capital valuation, liquidity and procyclicali-
ty.
BOX 3.2THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND WORK AT INTERNATIONAL FORA
1. Spain was invited to take part in both summits.
subject for debate is whether capital regulations intensify this inherent behaviour of financial 
agents. In particular, Basel II pursues better risk measurement and management. To this end, 
it uses a wide-ranging set of instruments, which include the greater sensitivity of capital re-
quirements to the risks assumed by institutions. 
The measurement of capital requirements proposed by Basel II is based on a series of param-
eters (for example, probability of default or PD) which increases during recessions along with 
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capital requirements. Institutions can react by attempting to reduce requirements, and, for this 
purpose, they may restructure loan portfolios and lower credit volume, consequently deepen-
ing the recession and thus further worsening the probability of default.
Currently under debate are the available alternatives for maintaining a model which accurately 
reflects the risks assumed by institutions (Basel II) but which is less procyclical. In particular 
two alternatives are proposed: (1) to fine-tune the calculation parameters (for example PD) to 
include the effect of the cycle; (2) to leave unchanged the calculations of these parameters and 
to fine-tune the final requirement arising from the Basel II formulae through a multiplier which 
smoothes their cyclical behaviour.
Aside from this necessary theoretical debate the results and implications of the various alterna-
tives have not been evaluated quantitatively. However, this has been done in the case of Spain 
using data from the Central Credit Register of corporations from 1987 to 2008. The methodol-
ogy used was to compute what the capital requirements in the period would have been, had 
Basel II been in force, and to compare to what extent their procyclicality would be reduced by 
applying the various theoretical proposals.1
The direct application of Basel II formulae results in procyclical requirements. The adjustments 
made through a multiplier (which evolves with the cycle) to the requirements obtained from the 
direct application of the Basel II formulae reduce procyclicality. The most effective multiplier 
depends on GDP. The growth of credit, stock market indices and other adjustment procedures 
offer less satisfactory results. If the default probabilities are calculated over the cycle, procycli-
cality is also reduced. The use of a mechanism like the GDP multiplier is straightforward and 
transparent, with the advantage of being practically automatic.
The foregoing must be considered from the perspective of establishing minimum capital re-
quirements and of how, from the regulatory standpoint, calculating them should not increase 
procyclicality. The level of capital required and how institutions adjust it to their specific fea-
tures is another matter. For this purpose, the above-mentioned mechanisms can be comple-
mented with counter-cyclical provisions (in use in Spain since mid-2000). The form these 
provisions must take is an issue open to international debate, as is how they fit into the current 
accounting framework, although they must be transparent, as they have been in Spain, to 
convey all the important information to investors.
Certain figures can shed light on Spain’s dynamic provisions, given the interest the latter have 
aroused internationally. Total consolidated loan loss provisions at end-2007 represented 1.3% 
of the total consolidated assets of Spanish deposit institutions, excluding the EU branches 
which are not subject to Spanish provision requirements. This figure compares with an equity-
to-consolidated assets ratio of 5.8%. Therefore, cumulative loan loss provisions represented 
26.6% of tier 1 capital as of that date. When evaluating these figures, it must be taken into 
account that, unlike other banking systems, the percentage of off-balance sheet assets of 
Spanish institutions is very low since they have not developed conduits and SIVs.
Not all the assets on a bank’s balance sheet require credit risk provisions. If we focus our at-
tention on assets subject to general provision requirements and we relate them solely to the 
general provision through the dynamic provision system, at end-2007 the coverage of lending 
to the private non-financial sector stood at 1.44% at consolidated level. This coverage has 
There are theoretical 
proposals to reduce it within 
the framework of Basel II…
… which in the case of 
Spain have been estimated 
quantitatively.
The requirements obtained 
from Basel II are procyclical, 
but this can be mitigated by 
using a GDP-based 
multiplier or calculating 
default probabilities over the 
cycle.
Dynamic provisions can also 
help to mitigate 
procyclicality.
3.3 The Spanish system 
of provisions as an 
example
1. See the paper by R. Repullo, J. Saurina and C. Trucharte, “Mitigating the Procyclicality of Basel II”, in the CEPR’s 
electronic book for the G20, “Macroeconomic Stability and Financial Regulation: Key Issues for the G20”.
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dropped in 2008, since institutions have begun to use this general provision due to the in-
crease in specific provisions. It should be taken into account that Spain together with the 
United States and Canada is, with the information collected by the Basel Committee, one of 
the few countries in which in June 2008 total loan loss provisions amply exceeded the ex-
pected losses calculated as at that date.
If the analysis is performed only for the Spanish credit market, the ratio of general loan loss 
provisions to total credit at individual balance sheet level at end-2007 was 1.2%. If exposures 
with 0% requirements are excluded (public sector and interbank), coverage rises to 1.6%.
Provision requirements vary according to the type of credit. There are six categories, with most 
exposures centring on the first four lower risk tranches. The parameters imply, for example, 
that for a mortgage loan on a principal residence (with an LTV of less than 80%), institutions 
have to record a provision for 0.71% of the amount extended which, assuming a loss given 
default (LGD) of 15%, means effective coverage of a bad debt ratio of up to 4.75%, which 
compares with this ratio’s peak of 3.85% in 1993 in the last recession when LGD was around 
zero.
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